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Some social scientists have argued that state legal institutions are not effective at protecting
immigrants. Proper evaluation of ethnographic data, they argue, shows that migrants
integrate themselves by forming strong, personal relationships of trust and friendship
minimally grounded in discourses of ethnicity or kinship. They also transcend legal and
cultural categories and assign roles other than those of the state. This article tests this
model against the experience of migrants, refugees, and transfronterizos/as (cross-border
laborers) engaged in informal ties of confianza (trust) in Ceuta, a small Spanish enclave
in Morocco. Workers claim that while ties of confianza can transform into kinship, they are
also ridden with suspicion and vulnerable to exploitation. Therefore, migrants claim they
must show a caradura (literally, a hard face) and be ready to stand up to their employers to
protect their interests. Ceutan employers, by contrast, use confianza to manage the risks of
dealing with hostile foreigners, to regulate state interference, and to integrate the migrant
on their terms. Building on anthropological theories of informal and domestic work, this
articles suggests that Ceutan confianza is better explained as an ambiguous, ethnically
informed discourse both migrants and employers use to navigate Ceuta’s unregulated
shadow economy. [Mediterranean, friendship, law, risk, domestic work]
Many social scientists have recently proposed that the key to the socioeconomic security
of immigrants does not lie with the state and its legal institutions. Outsiders, they argue,
integrate by forming personal, informal relationships—with locals and each other—that
often employ local idioms of trust and friendship. These ties, they add, have been ignored and
misunderstood by sociologists and geographers of migration, who instead tend to give undue
attention to bonds of kinship and ethnicity (Eve 2002; Ryan 2011). Friendship, they insist,
was considered unable to shape migrant identities or influence the institutional structures
of the host societies (Adams and Allan 1998; Bunnell et al. 2012). It was, moreover,
associated with nepotism and clientelism, phenomena held undesirable in modern, Western,
postcolonial society (Bell and Coleman 1999).
A thorough rereading of field data, however, indicated that friendship could indeed
be treated as a separate kind of tie, for it claims values, ideals, and obligations that are
only “minimally grounded” in ethnicity, kinship, gender, or any other categorical identity
(Coakley 2002; Dyson 2010 Morosanu 2013; Santos-Granero 2007). Following Glick-
Schiller (2008), some point out that this late awakening to the qualities of friendship
points to a fatal flaw in social scientific epistemology and methodology, whereby ethnicity
had slipped into becoming an unquestioned, taken-for-granted category determining
groups’ and individuals’ identity, behavior, and alliances.1 Sociological research had
become all about finding differences across reified ethnic boundaries rather than about
analyzing how those boundaries are constituted, transgressed, or mobilized in the first
place (Brubaker 2002). Ethnicity the explanandum had turned into ethnicity the explanans
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(Hempel and Oppenheim 1948). Shifting attention from the integration of communities to
the construction of transnational networks and friendships offered a way out (Conradson
and Latham 2005; Giordano 2010).
Recognizing friendship as a distinct type of relationship, these scholars insist, provides
novel perspectives on overlooked crucial dynamics of postcolonial multicultural societies.
If “friendship” is sociologically defined as (1) a voluntary relationship, (2) between two
irreplaceable individuals, (3) evolves through time, and (4) has important emotional, polit-
ical, and economic benefits for both partners (Pettigrew 1998; Terrel 2015; Voelker 2007),
then it could be logically expected to lead to relationships and networks that override
boundaries of class, ethnicity, gender, or nationality (Bridge 2002; Skelton 2009; Werking
1997). Critics here draw inspiration from scholars such as Granovetter (1973), who describe
how, paradoxically, it is the “weak ties” of trust-based friendship formed with locals that
give foreigners access to work, contacts, and the opportunity for prosperity. Communities
sticking to the “strong ties” of kinship and ethnicity lock themselves in economically stag-
nant, inward-looking enclaves (Boyd 1989; De Luca 2003; Granovetter 1973; Irek 2011).
Unsurprisingly, this literature ascribes this liberated friendship as having many virtues. It
promotes an “inward reflexivity” that dissolves stereotypes as superficial and irrelevant
(Amin 2006; Datta 2009), decreases multicultural anxieties (Schlueter 2012; Tropp and
Pettigrew 2005; Valentine 2008), and supplies migrants with the sociocultural capital needed
to access new resources and spaces (Li 2004). Migrant–host friendships have been even
proposed as benchmarks of or for social integration (Esser 1986).
This article tests the sociological model of friendship against the experiences of migrants,
refugees, and transfronterizos/as (cross-border laborers [male and female, respectively], a
term primarily used by the Ceutan government) engaged in ties claiming confianza (trust)
and amistad (friendship) in Ceuta, a small Spanish enclave in Morocco. Working primarily
as undocumented domestic or construction workers, they complain that the language of trust
masks ties that are both fragile and exploitative. To protect their interests, they feel they must
learn to strategically balance complacency with subtle forms of resistance. Sometimes, they
insist, they must even adopt a caradura (literally, a hard face), an uncomfortable stance
denoting constant readiness to daringly stand up for themselves when they sense their
employers acting in unfair and underhanded ways. Ceutan employers, by contrast, use
the notion of confianza to manage the risks of dealing with potentially hostile foreigners,
to regulate interference from the state, and, therefore, to integrate the migrant on their
terms.
Building on anthropological literature on migration and informal labor, I suggest that
ethnicity and kinship are not distinct from but are central to how ties of confianza are struck
and subsequently managed. By extension, Ceutan confianza would be better explained
as an ethnically informed discourse that is pragmatically used by both foreign labor and
local employers to attempt to (de)legitimize and initiate or break informal ties; anticipate,
articulate, and navigate hazards; and secure and hold political and economic advantages in
Ceuta’s unregulated shadow economy. One effect of confianza is thus to shift the informal
market from one that values alienable skills to one that hires persons based on their presumed
moral integrity. This conclusion is based on the discursive and practical strategies that I
observed migrants and employers use on a daily basis in Ceuta between 2010 and 2012,
during which time I also taught one-on-one English classes and collaborated as a freelance
journalist with some of Ceuta’s main newspapers. Accordingly, my data is supplemented
by newspaper articles, also collected during fieldwork, as well as by formal interviews
with politicians, bureaucrats, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) with a stake in
immigration.
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The Pillars of Hercules
Overlooking the Strait of Gibraltar, Ceuta—along with Melilla and a few other islets along
the Mediterranean coast of Morocco—belongs to Spain. In 1995, much to the anger of the
Kingdom of Morocco, which claims the city as its own, Ceuta was granted autonomous
status by the central government in Madrid. Aside from reaffirming it as an inextricable
part of the Spanish nation-state, this move gave Ceuta extensive self-governing capabilities
comparable to Spain’s mainland communities, although matters pertaining to national
interest, including cross-border trade and informal labor, are managed by a delegate who
is sent by Madrid.
A 2011 census put Ceuta’s population at eighty-two thousand. The figure is unhelpful
because it says nothing about Ceuta’s cosmopolitan demography. In effect, Ceutan
bureaucrats estimate that only 56 percent of the enclave’s population is “Christian” (a term
locally referring to Spanish peninsular origin, not faith), and many of these are recently
arrived de fuera (outsiders) from the mainland who were attracted by the wage bonuses, tax
cuts, and job security offered by Ceuta’s only real industry: the large civil service required
to run its government. Hindus and Jews—wealthy traders and landowners— represent
another 1 percent of the population. The remaining 43 percent is Muslim. Constituting
Ceuta’s precarious underclass of laborers, petty traders, or low-level bureaucrats, Muslims
bitterly remark they lack the socioeconomic capital to compete for jobs in the civil service.
Trade with the hinterland has long been crucial to Ceuta’s economy. The brutal Spanish
colonization of northern Morocco (1912–1956) transformed Ceuta from a miserable prison-
fort into Spain’s busiest port, ferrying troops and resources across the Strait of Gibraltar
(Driessen 1992; O’Reilley 1994). The protectorate ended in 1956, but my Ceutan informants
often said that cross-border trade climaxed in the 1980s. They nostalgically recall long days
and nights haggling over the endless stream of containers passing through Ceuta’s Freeport.
The fortification of Ceuta’s border, along with vigorous competition from Morocco and
Gibraltar, means that bulk trading is over, and while some successful bulk traders still
operate from the enclave, most of the goods they shuffle across the world no longer pass
through the city’s ports. However, Ceuta’s expanding civil service created a professional
class wealthy enough to aspire to own a house and, often, a servant to maintain it. Ceuta’s
census is therefore also silent concerning the thrity to forty thousand Moroccans who
crowd through the fortified Tarajal Gate every morning to work in the city. Most Moroccan
men work informally in construction sites around Ceuta or in unskilled maintenance and
shopkeeping jobs. Women, attracted by the prospect of independent income, are informally
hired as domestic workers in Ceutan homes. Unmarried Moroccan women use this income
to help build their houses, married women find this income offers some independent
power, and single parents (widowed, divorced, or separated) need the income to survive.
Their chores include cooking, cleaning, laundry, and food shopping, although these often
quickly spread to unforeseeable tasks such as taking children to school, caring for the
sick and elderly, and even walking the family dog. Informal laborers make approximately
five to seven Euros per hour, and sometimes lunch (since, when cooking, the domestic
worker is allowed to prepare something extra for herself). Moroccans find these rates
acceptable, allowing them to beat competition from Ceuta’s Spanish Muslims, who cannot
live on such returns, since rents in Ceuta are notoriously high. In 2011, the rent for
a two-bedroom apartment averaged nine hundred Euros monthly. Civil servant bonuses
are designed to accommodate these prices. Muslims insist that these bonuses seek to
attract Christian migration to counter Muslim’s birth rates. Live-in arrangements between
Spaniards and Moroccans are rare, partly because visitors from the Yebala region are
forbidden to stay overnight in Ceuta, but mainly because many cross-border laborers
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complement incomes by selling goods they are permitted to carry both ways across the
border.
Despite their ubiquity, relations between Spaniards and cross-border laborers are gener-
ally cold. My Spanish informants offered many explanations. Moroccans, they say, are by
nature selfish and deceitful, an increasingly fierce Islam commands hostility toward Chris-
tians, and decades of Spanish colonialism has produced hateful resentment. All agreed it
best, however, to assume that the moro/a—a derogatory term for Moroccan Muslim males
and females respectively—will damage Spanish interests if given the opportunity. Moroc-
cans similarly complain that those greedy Spaniards, thinking themselves superior, have no
qualms about firing them when they resist exploitation. Surprisingly, Moroccans will not
work for Ceutan Muslims unless desperate for money or compelled by kinship obligations.
They consider Ceutan Muslims to be, at best, baselessly snobbish and, at worst, traitors
to the Moroccan cause. On a practical level, they fear that their Muslim employers would
make them “slave away” after their large families for miserable pay. Ceutan Muslims return
the animosity, and avoid relying on what they consider to be thieving, jealous foreigners.
Also active in Ceuta’s informal economy are those sub-Saharan, Syrian, and Indian
refugees who survived the traumatic entry into the European Union and the subsequent
attempts to deport them. Unlike the moros/as, who possess malignant agency, asylum
seekers are viewed as humanitarian victims worthy of Ceutan charity, and sometimes they
are offered informal work as shopkeepers or cleaners in churches. As an easily recognizable
minority, however, employers hesitate to hire them; and when they do, they keep them out
of sight.
The Idiom of Trust
In Ceuta, both employers and informal laborers routinely couch their relationships in the
widely used language of confianza. Dictionaries generally translate this as “trust,” yet
users of the term make a distinction between confiar, confiado/a, and tener confianza.
Confiar refers to taking an action that involves risk, bringing it close to an understanding of
trust assumed by neoclassical economic theory (see Rompf 2012, 119–129). Confiado/a,
by extension, describes an overly trusting person who is either recklessly confident or
innocently ignorant of danger. Inviting the moro/a into one’s home or private business is
one particular source of peril that needs to be managed properly, lest disaster strikes. Blame
would then solely lie with the Spaniard, a confiado/a who knew or ignored the risks of his
or her actions.
Partners engaged in informal labor, nevertheless, claim that their relationships tiene
confianza (literally, have trust). First, much like models of friendship reviewed above, this
bond is based on the mutual recognition of valued personal characteristics and is forged by
individuals who consider each other de confianza (trustworthy). Loli, the wife of a wealthy
civil servant, for example, often told me that she has confianza with Fatima, her unmarried
Moroccan maid, because she is “loyal,” “reliable,” and “very hardworking.” These flattering
adjectives were but three (as well as humble, tireless, honest, and respectable) that emerged
when employers discussed—with myself or other Ceutans—their relationship with those
who work for them. Fatima, likewise, has confianza with Loli because her “good heart”
understands her occasional need to leave work and attend to her ailing mother in Te´touan.
Informal laborers, both men and women, emphasize these qualities as the markers of a
“good family” or “good boss” worthy of one’s trust. Ties of confianza are not given but
forged through the display of personal worth and esteem.
Second, even though informal workers refer to their employers as el jefe (the boss) or la
sen˜ora (the mistress), and Ceutans speaks of their employees as la muchacha (the girl) or
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mano de obras (manual laborer), they use first names when undergoing their daily business
and stress that their relationship, aside from being one of confianza, is also one of amistad
(friendship), and that they are amigos/as (friends). The idioms of trust and friendship
imply, of course, ties between individuals (not groups) who cannot be substituted. One can
replace a laborer but not a friend, an argument that, as I explain, is good for blocking state
interference. Additionally, these individual relationships ignore categories of nationality,
religion, law, gender, and class. Ceutans often explained that they “don’t care what their
[worker’s] name is,” as long as they exhibit trustworthy qualities. This is important because
a name is an indicator of ethno-religious background, and, by some extension, nationality.
The idiom of trust, therefore, allows the possibility of finding redeemable moros/as.
Third, people who “have confianza” report that they develop a sense of mutual economic
and emotional apoyo (dependence). Morena, the wife of a senior high-school teacher, with
tears in her eyes, described Sohra, her maid: “[She is] the cloth with which I dry my tears,
because in order not to worry my family, I tell her all my problems. She is always ready
to listen and offer advice.” Loli said, “Ever since I have been diagnosed with a chronic
sickness, Fatima has been my hands and my feet. She is a real friend who has improved life
drastically for me.” The sense of mutual dependency is generally associated with the right
to pass on harsh, unsettling critiques in the interest of wanting the best for one’s friend.
I was often told, la confianza da asco (disgusts). Bosses are consequently quick to point
out problems with their employees. In return, muchachas might summon the confidence
to admonish sen˜oras on anything from spoiling children to bad home economics. As Loli
notes, this can be a humbling experience:
It probably has to do with the economic condition in Morocco, but I have learnt
a lot of tricks from her. She reproaches me if I buy from expensive places, and
shows me how to save money, make good deals, and preserve food!
Informal laborers who become friends with their employers also receive benefits. Typically,
this involves the muchacha—not Ceutan kin—getting the first pick of unneeded clothes
and accessories. Sometimes, more urgent services are needed. One morning, Ghalia, the
maid, called Pilar, her sen˜ora, desperately crying that her newborn child was not breathing
properly. Pilar told her to come to Ceuta quickly, and then accompanied her to the hospital.
The doctors, however, told them to go to Ca´diz, on the Spanish mainland, for proper
care. They were given official medical papers, but Ghalia was not allowed on the ferry.2
Desperate, they rushed back to the office of the governmental delegate, to whom Pilar
declared she was ready to legally vouch for her muchacha and her dying baby. This finally
got them across to Ca´diz. “I took responsibility for her,” Pilar often told me, “as if she
were my daughter.” This echoes anthropological reports that describe how evidence of
suffering (particularly terminal illness and sexual violence) is becoming a passport into an
increasingly fortified Europe (Ticktin 2011).
“Una mas”
“Pedro was the son of the sen˜ora,” Mariam, a Moroccan, reminisced one evening after
Spanish class:
He hated Moroccans for how they turned his neighborhood into a ghetto when
they migrated. But we started talking and became friends. We had a lot of
confianza, and he supported me by telling me things I didn’t know about the
medical system, social security, how much I should be earning.
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Much to the distaste of their relatives, Mariam and Pedro fell in love and married. When,
after a few years, Mariam wanted to work again, he helped her obtain a job with a “good
family” and “a contract with a proper wage and welfare benefits!”
Confianza, many insist, constitutes the basis for more intimate relationships based on
amor (love) and carin˜o (affection), which lead to marriage. The conversion of friendship
into affinity, despite protest from kin, is not uncommon. However, those who remain
friends also use the language of kinship to stress the intimacy of their relationships with
transfronterizos/as. Ceutan employers similarly claim their workers are like “sisters” or,
as with Ghalia, like “daughters” to them. Muchachas often become “second mothers” or
“aunts” to the sen˜oras’ children. Most often, they are elevated to the status of una mas
(literally, one more), another member of the family; that is, “one of us.” One evening, after
I gave Raquel’s sons their English lessons, she commented:
The muchacha started working with us ten years ago. She has seen my sons
grow up, just as I have; she has picked them up from school, fed them, cleaned
their clothes, washed them, took them to the doctor, and gave them medicine.
She has reproached them when they misbehaved. We did not see it happening,
[but] she is now una mas, a second mother to my children.
Mina, from Tangiers, claims that one of the greatest days of her life was when she was
invited to the confirmation of the son of her sen˜ora, Rocı´o. The latter, in a separate interview,
added:
When my eldest turned eighteen, I sent him to Granada to study. The day before
he left, I heard someone crying. It was Mina. She told me that it was sad that
she was ironing the clothes my son was to take with him to Granada. She felt
as if one of her sons was leaving. . . . My son always calls when he knows she
is around. When I ask if he’s eating well, [he] says he misses Mina’s lentils. I
wonder who his mother is!
To sum up, ties of confianza seem efficient at overcoming the dangers Ceutans perceive
from ethnic outsiders. The “weak ties” of confianza can furthermore become “strong
bonds” of kinship, assigning roles complementing (una mas, aunt, second mother) or even
displacing (mother) Ceutan statuses. These symbolic roles offer affection, respect, and
power. Muchachas come to exert control over household finances and authority over the
children of sen˜oras. They become the locus of commensality, and find they can place moral
obligations on their mistresses, particularly in emergencies.
Giving a Finger, Taking the Hand
Accounts glorifying confianza, however, constitute but the tip of the iceberg of narratives
offered by both informal laborers and their employers. Moroccan cross-border laborers
would find their experiences better apprehended by anthropologists concerned with how
trust-based friendships, interwoven with their political context, can be hazardous affairs
(Daniel and Knudsen 1995; Gambetta 1988; Paine 1999). They would also align themselves
with feminist anthropologists concerned with the challenges and contradictions that emerge
with valuing domestic work and hiring domestic workers. For example, while these workers
have to be paid, neoliberal ways of structuring work in terms of clearly defined and finite
tasks cannot be realistically applied to tasks involving caring for a home (such as doing
the cleaning, buying materials, keeping order) and facilitating the reproduction of family
relationships (for example, cooking, tending to the young, and caring for the sick and
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elderly) (Colen and Sanjek 1990; Dickey and Adams 2000; Shah 2002). In other words,
while employers are nominally hiring a worker’s time, what they are really buying is the
power to place demand on a worker’s caring sensibilities and, thus, on their moral integrity
as persons (Anderson 2000).
This contradiction produces work environments liable to turn very nasty, quickly. In
Ceuta, I never encountered cases in which domestic work slid into sexual violation rem-
iniscent of slavery (Hansen 1990; Healy 1994). However, as with other cases worldwide,
Ceutan employers seek muchachas that are “motherly,” “loyal,” “affectionate,” and “clean,”
and who would never abandon a crying, hungry, or sick child or leave a room half cleaned
when the stipulated workday is over. When demands are placed on the worker’s personal
integrity, responsibilities easily multiply, days lengthen, and contracts (if granted) become
irrelevant caricatures of what the job really entails (Lesley 1994; Romero 1992; Silverman
2005).
In feminist literature, employers tend to respond to these obvious contradictions in two
ways. First, they extend the language of kinship into hired labor. Clearly, the worker should
now no longer be motivated solely by financial remuneration but must prioritize her new
family over her own (Anderson 2013; Aklam 2007; Yakuta 1993). As I show, this can
develop into a lose-lose situation, in which, first, rejecting kinship might see a muchcacha
fired, while embracing it might generate fears that the outsider really is becoming a member
of the family. Second, sen˜oras hire “ethnic others” because it allows them to improve their
position not by scoring political victories against patriarchy but also by dumping junk tasks
on persons who are “first ethnic others, then women” (Anderson 2000; hooks 1982). Indeed,
Ceutan matrons often commented that their muchachas’ “traditional Moroccan” upbringing
magically attunes to the home, making them excellent housekeepers (when they want to
be). They never consider whether this Moroccan expertise might be the result, rather than
cause, of transfronterizas’ decisions to work in Ceuta.
These strategies emerge clearly in transfronterizas’ narratives. For example, Mina joined
Rocı´o’s household after the previous muchacha was dismissed because she was terrified
of the dog Rocı´o had bought for her children, and the muchacha refused to walk it. Mina
would spend the next five years displaying her worth by working every day, “even when
she’s sick.” After six years, she was entrusted with some house finances; by the eighth
year, she became una mas who ran the household as a second mother, was invited to family
rituals, and eventually was “granted a contract.”
Mina’s story is a relatively smooth one. Most laborers quickly conclude that meekness
only results in trabajando para nada (working for nothing, and thus confining oneself in
permanent and senseless exploitation). Accordingly, linguistic skills need to be reinforced,
lessons on how employers think must be distilled from daily experience, social networks
have to be expanded, a caradura should be shown, and relationships broken if need be.
For example, Mariam, introduced earlier, was happily married and legitimized. Her story,
however, began eight years earlier, when her cousin— a domestic worker—encouraged her
to leave her job in a textile factory for a placement she found with a Christian family in
Ceuta. The pay was good, but after a couple of months, she was asked to work weekends
and to sleep over on weekdays. She tried to negotiate, because she had an elderly mother to
take care of at home. Her Spanish was poor, so her attempts to request a compromise were
seen as impudent protest, and she was fired. Some months later, a friend recommended her
to an old, childless Ceutan man. Desperate for money, she took the job. Mariam grew to
like him, but as the years rolled by and his health waned, she realized she had basically
become a nurse, and she was fearful that if an emergency were to happen, she would be
unable to call for help. Worse, she attracted the hatred of the man’s sister, who thought that
May 2018 Page 167
Mariam, as una mas, stood a chance of receiving a share of his inheritance. One day, while
Mariam was cleaning the man’s bedroom, the sister burst in and accused her of theft. Sure
enough, some of the money Mariam knew the man kept in his room—some thirty thousand
Euros—had disappeared. Unable to argue her case effectively (defenderse) in Spanish, she
was branded a shameless, lying mora and dismissed. She spent a year in Morocco, and then
enrolled at a Ceutan institution offering Spanish courses for immigrants. As her Spanish
improved, she sought the assistance of NGOs that provide information on laborers’ rights.
This, indeed correlates with the rise of Spanish NGOs in charge of managing relations
between the state and the migrant, reported by scholars of migration, who also insist that
while NGOs see themselves as the representatives of Spain’s liberal, civil society, they
are not free of Islamophobic biases and often end up becoming apparatuses of the state’s
repressive powers (Dietz 2000).
Eventually, Mariam felt ready for another job. Her caradura got her a good salary, but
her new Christian family would not give her a contract. Unable to budge them, she left. Her
NGO friends introduced her to another Christian family, which is how she met her future
husband.
Much like Mariam, all of my transfronteriza informants feel they are walking on thin ice.
Suspicion is constant. Passionate, scathing accusations of theft and betrayal strike without
warning. They are also dismissed if only suspected of deceit: Is she secretly buying things
for herself when shopping for food? Is she inviting friends, or taking showers, when nobody
is at home? Ceutan employers acknowledge their maids’ superior knowledge of housework,
and accordingly are never quite sure whether their maids are working too slowly or too
rapidly. Such suspicions can simmer for weeks on end, until employers, unable to bear the
uncertainty of not knowing whether their transfronteriza is guilty, fire her.
Furthermore, where the language of friendship is infused with that of charity, a caradura
can backfire. In Morocco, I was often told that people “have nothing.” The salaries they
obtain in Spain are “all they have.” Anderson (2006) argues that this rhetoric of “char-
ity” is common in the world of informal migrant labor, and helps employers handle
the disturbing feeling of having total power over an individual. In Ceuta, however, this
discourse places employers in a morally impregnable position. Labor using caradura to
negotiate demands or privileges only serves to depict the employee as greedy and shame-
less, a parasite that the softhearted, betrayed confiado/a employer can—and should—
expel. Charity, like trust, is a way of maintaining, not lessening, control over an uncertain
situation.
Migrants fear that following dishonorable dismissals, they will be unable to find “a good
family/boss” and will end up in the worst position: on la calle (the street). In Ceuta, another
way to manage the risk posed by the hostile foreigner is to hire labor recommended by
those with whom one shares confianza. These are generally neighbors or family members
who are looking to place workers they no longer require. It is also normal for trustworthy
employees, upon request, to recommend workers for their employers’ friends, or to replace
those who decide to stop working. If trust collapses, however, so does the chain of referral,
and foreign workers with poor connections might find themselves “knocking on doors”
in search of work. Ties made this way, they insist, never work, since the process of
referral, which provides some security on which trust could flourish, is absent. Talk of
charity predominates instead. Transfronterizas consider la calle to be but one step above
prostitution, and some in this situation claimed that they had been approached by pimps
who would “get them started.” Prostitution represents the ultimate failure of transfronteriza
work: shameful, dangerous, and unreliable, and with no room for advancement. It even
destroys one’s identity, as fake names must be adopted.
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Enacting Trust
Interestingly, even those foreigners who report having strong bonds with their employers
report a constant unease. Many, thus, pursue the acquisition of a legal contract, as they
believe it offers protection in a context operating on the strategic inaccuracies of confianza.
Their efforts toward legitimization expose further problems regarding the integrative powers
of trust and friendship.
Wages, border crossings, and the meaning of law
After years of service, satisfied employers might consider granting a contract. Legitimiz-
ing informal laborers, however, is a nightmare. It starts with a visit by the employer and
(prospective) employee to the Foreign Office to seek a Nu´mero de Identificacio´n de Ex-
tranjero (NIE), a card that allows non-Spanish nationals to access to medical services,
sign work contracts, or pay taxes. Next, the laborer must present a passport, medical and
criminal records, and proof of residency from Moroccan authorities (who require bribes).
A notary then drafts the contract. Finally, a pension scheme is set up. The process costs
around one thousand Euros and takes several months.
Employers undergoing this process generally find they were grossly underpaying their
laborers. Paco, who often boasted how well he treated his muchacha, was shocked to find he
needed to pay an additional fifty Euros per month to meet the minimum wage and another
171 Euros for the pension scheme. Juan, likewise, realized he was both underpaying and
overworking his muchacha. Law states that part-time employees should work twenty hours
per week; his muchacha was working twenty-nine hours per week. Paco absorbed the cost.
Juan fired the worker, afraid that the government was now aware of and investigating his
illegal employment of his Moroccan maid.
Legitimation nets other benefits that can place both partners at ease. Accidents at work,
surprisingly common given that Ceutans are not always aware of their safety obligations,
can be treated at Spanish hospitals without the danger of police inquiries. Pilar legitimized
Ghalia following their misadventure crossing to the mainland. Sohra, introduced earlier,
gave birth three times in Ceutan hospitals. Two of those had been complicated deliveries,
but Morena solemnly explained to me that Sohra’s contract entitled her to Spain’s superior
medical service. Social security also gives laborers a card they can use to enter Ceuta
through a special gate, saving them the slow-moving queues, bottlenecks, form-writing,
shoving, and pickpocketing that is the normal state of affairs at the border.
Successful legitimization, therefore, comes when the employer is convinced that the
benefits of including the state outweigh the risk of surrendering total control over the
worker. Unlike in the literature discussed above (Lesley 1994; Romero 1992; Silverman
2005), in Ceuta contracts are not made to establish the terms of employment or settle
conflict (something they cannot do anyway) but to confirm ties of realized confianza in
a certificate imbued with the authority of the state. Contracts enact trust and point to the
intention of permanence and commitment in a context marked by economic and semiotic
instability. It should not be a surprise that foreign workers maintain the papers marking
their employment status in pristine condition, and keep them on hand at all times. They are
more than legal documents: they are markers of being self-made in Ceuta.
Transcending locality
At the age of twenty-one, Ravi left his home village in India’s Uttar Pradesh region to
follow his father’s footsteps to earn good money in Europe. A “travel agency” took his
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18,500 Euros and his passport, and got him to Morocco, where he was smuggled into
Ceuta via a hidden compartment in a van, and he was told to look for the “men in green,”
meaning the Guardia Civil, Spain’s semimilitary border force. He did so, and was taken
to Ceuta’s overcrowded migrant accommodation center to await his fate. Months rolled
by, and concerned that he would be permanently forgotten, Ravi joined the other Indian
migrants camping in Ceuta’s foothills. Ravi did not last very long: he became sick and had
to seek medical care. At the hospital, he made friends with two NGO workers, who taught
him Spanish, explained his rights, and eventually invited him to live with them. When he
recovered, he started visiting the Hindu temple, where he was offered a job (“Not illegally!
It was a ‘humanitarian gesture’ toward our suffering brother!” the spokesperson of the
Hindu community insisted). It paid little, but it kept him busy.
A year after his arrival, Ravi was taken to mainland Spain, where authorities had sixty
days to decide whether to deport him. At the fifty-seventh day, he was granted permission
to stay. Ravi was free, but in mainland Spain he also friendless. “From the streets,” he found
a job as a waiter in Marbella. For two years, Ravi worked fifteen hours a day, earned nine
hundred Euros a month, and slept at the restaurant. His Spanish boss started to demand
more hours, and then withheld pay, claiming he wanted to open another restaurant. Ravi’s
caradura secured a fraction of his wage so he could visit his family in India, but when he
came back to Spain, he found no wages forthcoming, so he decided to leave the restaurant.
He found some odd jobs, but eventually, exhausted, returned to Ceuta, where his NGO
friends secured a contract for him in a local business.
Aarav, also from Uttar Pradesh, paid thirteen thousand Euros to cross the Sahara and
another three thousand Euros to be smuggled into Ceuta. Like Ravi, he joined the hill camps.
He struck up a friendship with a sympathetic Hindu businessman who often visited with
food. This businessman gave him a job in a bazaar, where Aarav was quickly recognized
as a trustworthy, reliable worker. Eventually he too was called to mainland Spain and given
his freedom, but he had no luck finding work, and refused to take jobs “off the street.”
He contacted his old boss, who sent him a letter of recommendation (which he still keeps)
and directed him to a partner in Madrid. The businessman immediately employed Aarav
in a small restaurant he owned. The story ends well: proving himself a diligent worker,
his employer shouldered the twelve-hundred-Euro fee to have him employed legally and
permanently.
Ethnic stereotypes, thus, play an important role in creating friendships. It seems, how-
ever, that trust that is based on ties confer no privileges beyond the social relations in which
they were given. This greatly worried my migrant informants. Ravi and Aarav were helpless
outside of Ceuta. Transfronteriza maids found that the rights they earned in one household
could not be transferred to another. By factoring in the long years of hardship and luck
required to become an uno/a mas, and adding in the real danger of having to start all over if
things go wrong, one starts to grasp why immigrants want contracts and references, despite
their inability to avoid or resolve conflicts with their bosses. Transfronterizos/as used con-
tracts as letters of recommendation and enactments of trust when they needed to find new
positions, as these papers pointed to the worth someone saw in them after many years of
work. Contracts turned them from hostile strangers into potentially hardworking individu-
als. Only confiados/as, they say, worked for employers who refused to acknowledge this.
Ahmed’s tragic saga
One morning, Ahmed crossed the border to find his little shop in Ceuta barred by the police.
The government had shut it down, he was told, because he lacked the proper permits. When
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journalists, who had been invited by Ahmed’s friends, arrived on the scene, they found him
“staring in disbelief,” his “sobs punctuated by furious appeals to God for explanation.” The
newspaper article that followed went to great lengths to show the cold injustice of Ceuta’s
government. For four decades Ahmed, now sixty-nine years old, would wake at 4 a.m. to
join the long queues at the border, walk to the Ceutan marketplace, and sell groceries from
a stall owned by a Spanish businessman with whom he grew to have confianza. When the
businessman retired, he entrusted Ahmed with the shop in exchange for a weekly rent of
twenty-five Euros. Ahmed “is intimidated by laws and regulations,” but he never failed to
pay his dues to his boss, and then to his daughter when he passed away. On a good week, he
might earn fifty Euros, so it is a mystery how he fed his family of fourteen, none of whom
could find work. The story ends with Ahmed’s furious marketplace colleagues mounting a
petition that failed to make the government revoke its decision. The governmental delegate,
they concluded, “bullies the weak but cowers before the rich” (El Faro de Ceuta 2012b).
Verinis (2007), in discussing the integration of migrants into Greek rural society, observes
how “fieldwork . . . can investigate local narratives [and] linguistic strategies . . . to expose
the processes in becoming group members.” Indeed, my ethnographic data inclines me to
agree that narratives are never neutral, obvious, or fixed, but instead are strategically
assembled by both employers and informal laborers in moments in which confianza is
challenged and intruded upon. I would add that it is not a surprise that confianza chooses to
articulate itself in story form. Narratives weave unique tales that transform “contemporaries”
into “consociates” (Carrithers 2008), which is what Ceutan notions of trust are all about.
Thus, in 2012, the Ceutan government launched a campaign to stamp out illegal businesses
and cafe´s it suspected of being hubs of drug trade. Shop owners responded in the news
with tragic stories of how the government had destroyed the livelihoods of the trustworthy,
honest workers they had worked with for years. Such stories turned the protagonists into
victims, whose great friendship—which embedded the foreigner in local communities—
was wrecked by the villainous, distant state blindly enforcing its categories.
While these tactics produced stories of solidarity and of tyrannical governments, Ahmed
remained jobless and his family unfed. This again indicates why informal laborers pursue
documentation: it is sufficient protection from the state when it comes blindly knocking.
Falling Great Distances
For employers, the state blinds itself whenever it can, because engaging with confianza
means engaging in complicated dramas that spill beyond legal categories. In 2012, a
delegate confessed that efforts to legitimize informal labor had failed (El Faro de Ceuta
2012a). Ceutan employers said they would rather sack their workers than pay tax, leading to
concerns that attempts to control the shadow economy might destroy it. Equally unappealing
was that the campaign required prospective employers first to hire an unemployed Ceutan,
and then only nominate a replacement if the Ceutan proved inadequate after a three-month
probationary period. The delegate also admitted that translating the bonds of confianza
into that between labor and capital was difficult. The state’s lawyers could not decide
whether foreign workers were “employees,” trabajadores del hogar (houseworkers), or even
maestros (professionals), and if they received “salaries,” “donations,” or “contributions”
for their “labor” or “service.” As a delegate conceded, “The context in which this work is
conducted is rooted in personal intimacy and confianza, and alien to common regulations
of work relations” (El Faro de Ceuta 2012c).
The government’s inability to conceptualize confianza has led to disturbing spectacles of
indecision and incompetence. In 2008 Ali Duas, a Moroccan, was hired to do maintenance
on a Spanish ship, but he fell off the vessel’s mast, plunging more than forty-nine feet to
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his death. Duas’s family hired a lawyer and sued the Spanish employers. Two years later,
another transfronterizo, Mohamed, was painting the outside of a house. Hanging from the
side of the building, Mohamed lost his balance and fell to the street below. Panicked, his
Ceutan Muslim employer put Mohamed in his car, left him on the steps of the hospital, and
drove off. Mohamed died an hour later. His employer was apprehended by the police and
charged with manslaughter and the illegal employment of foreigners.
Duas’s and Mohamed’s lawyers claimed the deceased were poor chapuzas (unskilled,
cheap manual workers, often stereotyped as producing shoddy work) who crossed the border
to earn their daily wages doing odd jobs. They accused the employers of not providing the
safety measures required by law. The defendants pleaded not guilty, claiming that the
Moroccans were maestros who, though informally hired, were responsible for their own
safety. The trials dragged on from 2006 to 2012, at which time the exhausted jury was
finally won over by the defendants’ argument: Duas had died of “extreme recklessness”
at the place of work. “The relationship between worker and the person who required his
services,” the jury stated, “was not one of a contractual nature” (El Faro de Ceuta 2012e).
Mohamed’s jury quickly followed suit, adding that as a sinpapeles (undocumented) worker,
his employment was based on confianza, a relationship not covered by labor law. The jury
found that Mohamed was a “friend” who acted freely under his own volition. The Ceutan
employer was also absolved of manslaughter, with the court admonishing him for moving
the wounded man but also commending him for trying to save the Moroccan’s life (El Faro
de Ceuta 2012f).
Again, confianza exhausts and outmaneuvers attempts at governance. Moreover, given
the absence of a legal framework, Ceutan courts reacted to an essentially morally ambiguous
situation by whitewashing the Spaniards and piling so much blame on the outsiders that
their families even had to pay the costs of the trials. The Duas case not only became a legal
precedent that was used to speedily settle other trials but also lessened the urgency for a
code that might actually impart justice.
Conclusion
The trajectories of cross-border workers allow us to go beyond the theoretical position
recently developed by social scientists, who optimistically see the formation of friendship
and trust across ethnic boundaries as the cure to many postcolonial ills. This ethnographic
data also enables us to push beyond the Marxist-feminist literature, which gloomily holds
that these discourses of intimacy boil down to hidden forms of exploitation that allow
Western matrons to improve their positions in the household by oppressing other women.
First, in contrast to what the Marxist-feminist literature implies, the exploitative use of
discourses of “trust” and “friendship” is not specific to the “private-female” sphere of the
home (Anderson 2000, 1–8). On the contrary, and in parallel to what ethnographers of
rural informal work in the United States have documented (Van Onselen 1997), confianza’s
potential to resist state interference operates just as effectively in public-male spaces, such
as marketplaces and construction sites. These are spaces that involve tasks whose nature,
unlike that of domestic work, lend themselves better to the application of “neoliberal” and
legal categories.
Second, the social-scientific work reviewed in this article celebrates friendship as formed
between individuals. Nonetheless, confianza almost certainly fails if not invested with what
Rabinowitz calls a “minimal sense of trust” (1997, 119–145), which comes from various
types of recommendations. This indicates that trust can be transferred between individu-
als and invested in authoritative documents and shared narratives. While the literature on
friendship seeks to distance itself from “methodological ethnicity” (Glick-Schiller 2008),
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it must be careful not to slip into the “methodological individualism” that economic an-
thropologists and students of risk consistently criticize (Douglas 1994; Hart, Laville, and
Cattani 2010).
Third, idioms of friendship cannot be epistemologically detached from other categorical
identities (for example, emic notions of ethnicity, race, nationality, gender, class, or caste).
In this, I follow many social anthropologists, particularly those working in Europe and
the Mediterranean, whose long ethnographic engagement with “friendship” indicates it is
complexly intertwined with—and definitely not blind to—notions of ethnicity, generating
morally ambiguous ties of exchange and alliance that can be manipulated to either transgress
or reinforce sociocultural boundaries and structures of power. Thus, classical ethnographers
of southern Europe are deeply intrigued by the link between friendship, patronage, and
ethnicity.3 Contemporary authors similarly observe how, despite attempts by European
nation-states to control the movement of migrants’ bodies both within and without their
borders (AlBahari 2015; Andersson 2015; Cabot 2012), migrants have been resourceful
enough to operate local institutions and capitalize on local understandings of ethnicity-
friendship in order to secure some degree of socioeconomic success and integration.
Yukseker (2004) and Celik (2007), for example, each describe how female Russian
migrants, stereotyped as sexually adventurous and economically enterprising by Turkish
men, form delicate yet profitable trust-based partnerships with local businessmen that might
lead to marriage and citizenship. Anthropologists regularly report how in the Republic
of Malta, Italy, and France local entrepreneurs informally recruit sub-Saharans, whom
they consider to be “honest and hardworking,” over their “lazy” compatriots, whom they
expect would swindle and cheat them. While these relations are often short-lived, they
sometimes flourish into strong ties that supply migrants with badly needed economic
security, legal and medical protections, and positions of some responsibility and authority
(Baldwin-Edwards 2002; Cassar 2010; Reyneri 2007). In Spain, ethnographers and pro-
migrant activists routinely reiterate that the first North African migrants to arrive in the
1990s quickly formed friendships with local farmers, with whom they shared respect for
manual work and the difficult experience of moving to foreign countries (Suarez-Navas
2004). Following pressure from the EU, however, the Spanish state sought to project the
immigrant as a sociocultural threat, making the categorical suspicion of the potentially
dangerous ethnic outsider a factor to consider when negotiating bonds of interpersonal
respect (Arango 2000; Martı´nez Veiga 2010; Sole´ and Parella 2003, 122).
In Ceuta, too, ideas about ethnicity and kinship constitute stable ground on which
both workers and employers evaluate, navigate, and legitimize the risks of participating
in the enclave’s shadow economy. The rhetoric of kinship is used by Ceutan actors to
vie for moral position; to stabilize volatile relations; to insert some predictability in a
context laden with uncertainty; and, therefore, to maintain a state of inclusive exploita-
tion while blocking the state, which is thought of as unable to speak to the fears and
desires of the parties involved. Local ethnic stereotypes are just as crucial. On the one
hand, sub-Saharan or Indian refugees, though unwanted, are seen as the traumatized and
courageous victims of illegal migration, and are riskily employed as subjects of Ceutan
humanitarian charity. On the other hand, moros/as are assigned a creatively malevolent
agency that must be factored into the daily routines of anyone who is not a confiado/a.
Moroccan agency also implies that they voluntarily form ties of confianza. In tight places,
such as the criminal cases described above, this allows tactics of “responsibilisation,”
whereby “forms of inequality and blame are imposed on self-care rather than on struc-
tural problems that require cultural and political solutions” (Rogozen-Soltar 2012, 642).
Discourses assigning victimhood to sub-Saharan and Asian refugees, but hostile agency
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to Moroccans have been recorded elsewhere in Spain (Rogozen-Soltar 2007; Shryock
2010).
Fourth, the sociological literature on friendship largely omits the state. The Marxist-
feminist literature takes on domestic labor but projects the state as the manufacturer of
illegal, docile workers who can easily be exploited by citizens. While Ceuta’s awkward
documentation procedure could be read in such ways, the impression one gets from in-
terviews with bureaucrats and politicians is of frustration and confusion at their inability
to control (and tax) the shape-shifting, Jenga-like structure of the Ceutan economy. This
failure stems from the fact that confianza is more than just a way to moralize risk in lieu
of effective governmental control. Rather, it appears that in this unregulated laissez-faire
market, actors have used the language of confianza—and its associated claims on the
value of intimate ties between irreplaceable individuals—to command persons and their
moral integrity instead of their alienable skills, time, and labor. To excel in Ceuta’s shadow
economy, one must not only be a good builder or cleaner but also a fundamentally good,
reliable, and trustworthy person (and the odds are already against the moro/a). This, too, has
helped employers in the confianza-driven economy to control their potentially dangerous
employees while preventing the Ceutan government from applying its legal powers at will.
In effect, one of the achievements of confianza has been to dissuade foreign workers
from forming organizations with which to protest the Ceutan government, a route of action
championed by many feminist students of hired domestic labor (Anderson 2013; Ruhs
2013). They do not mobilize because they are constantly confronted with the inefficacy of
the Ceutan government as a potential ally. Transfronterizos/as are also aware that forcing
employers into contracts that clearly specify work obligations and limit Ceutans’ power to
dismiss their workers might truly destroy the industry, and with it their only real source of
income. They find that subtle forms of resistance reminiscent of Scott’s (1987) “Weapons
of the Weak”—parodying bosses, working quickly or slowly, conducting one’s business in
work hours, securing alternative engagements in case things go wrong, using fictive kinship
and confianza to place moral obligations, and trying to figure out what their unpredictable
employers think (they think)—are infinitely more effective. Transfronterizos/as think that
they have a better chance playing a rigged game than trying to change its rules.
Anthropologists working on migration in the Mediterranean have often noted how, in
contexts in which the nation-state is unwilling or unable to distribute legal rights, outsiders
use ethnicity–friendships to participate in local institutions that ascribe outsiders respect and
protection. For example, Kottmann (2011) notes how North African migrants participate
in village reenactments of the medieval battles that expelled Muslims from Spain. While
far-right parties see these events as reminders that “Spanishness” is incompatible with
Islam, Kottmann (2011) and Garrido Atienza (1998) argue that such rituals consolidate
these migrants as real members of Spain’s rural communities. In Malta, sub-Saharans are
becoming increasingly active in the islands’ religious feasts, at which their hard work and
enthusiasm sometimes elevates them into influential positions in the clubs that manage
these traditions so central to Maltese village identity (Cassar 2010). Similar phenomena
have been reported in Greece and Italy, where arrivals are incorporated in systems of fictive
kinship and patronage (Albahari 2009; Ebough and Curry 2000; Verinis 2007).
Ceuta takes this one step further by simply indicating that one could do other things to state
law, other than exclude it and rely on alternative systems to assign rights and privileges. The
confianza-based economy’s principle feature is, in fact, its ability to regulate governmental
participation as needed. On a simple temporal level, this happens when employers feel safe
surrendering some control over the migrant person. More remarkably, however, Ceuta’s
shadow economy is able to reinterpret and rechannel the power of the state to reinforce
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the economy that peddles persons rather than skills. In Ceuta, confianza finds its ultimate
expression when it is enacted, manifested, and materialized in documents whose primary
local functions are not to regulate a relationship or to resolve a conflict but instead to act
as a passport or proof that the person who holds them is reliable, and whose worth has
been exhibited through many years of locally meaningful evaluation and trial. If the Ceutan
government were to regulate its shadow economy, it would have to be aware that trust can
be enacted in multiple ways, and that its techniques of legal emancipation might ultimately
constitute modes of cultural domination.
Notes
The Royal Anthropological Institute Emslie-Horniman Fund and the STEPS Scholarship
of the Government of Malta funded the research on which this article is based.
1. This, Glick-Schiller (2008) argues, in turn, proceeds from an assumption that Western
nations are culturally homogenous and that diversity is a postcolonial phenomenon and
obviously ethnicity-based.
2. Despite its sprawling fortifications, the Moroccan–Ceutan border is fairly porous to all
sorts of travelers. The real challenge comes with crossing the Straits of Gibraltar and
reaching the European mainland. Though part of EU territory, Ceuta is not a Schengen
Area member, making such travel difficult, and the enclave is a trap for illegal migrants
who think they have reached Europe.
3. For a comprehensive analysis of the anthropological link between friendship and pa-
tronage, see Wolf 2001.
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